sess the lands which had been taken from them) and, for all its liberal facade, the Bourbon monarchy of the Two Sicilies was very much a dynastic state in the old style (witness the wry reports of British General William Bentinck, who had himself played an important part in the creation of the dual state).
Some Larger Questions
Despite the fascination of this sort of dramaturgic analysis of particular events, I want this essay to deal with the questions raised by the Sicilian case within a plane which is rather less historical, less colorful, more pretentious. With one eye fixed on the modern European experience, I want to ask myself whether modernization breeds revolution. (I should also like to ask, vice versa-does revolution breed modernization?-but within the compass of this article that is not possible.) That first formulation of the question is compact, but ambiguous. We shall, unfortunately, have to put a large part of our effort into the preliminary task of reducing the ambiguities. "Modernization" is a vague, tendentious concept. "Revolution" is a controversial one as well.
Instead of trying to pace off modernization precisely, I shall ordinarily substitute for it somewhat better defined processes, such as industrialization or demographic expansion. Instead of trying to grasp the essential genius of revolution, I shall offer a rather arbitrary set of definitions which appear to me to have considerable theoretical utility. I shall compensate for my arbitrariness by discussing violence, instability, and political conflict more extensively than a strict concentration on revolution would justify.
There are, furthermore, quite a few different senses in which one can imagine large-scale structural change as breeding, shaping, causing, sparking, or resulting from major political conflicts. Instead of striving to catalog and assess them all, I shall take a critical look at one synthesis of the relationships which are most often proposed, and try to communicate my reasons for thinking that (a) available theories which treat protest, conflict, violence, and revolution as direct responses to the stresses of structural change are wrong; (b) the strong effects of largescale change on conflict run through the structure of power, especially by shaping the organizational means and resources available to different possible contenders for power; and (c) there are nevertheless certain kinds of short-run crises which tend to promote conflict, or even revolution, by affecting the likelihood that major participants in the political system will make or reject claims of great importance for the structure of power. 429
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Pursuit of the first two problems (the conceptual difficulties and the direct relationships between structural change and revolution) will lead to a third set of questions: if the political process is so important after all, what are the political conditions for conflict, violence, and revolution? The discussion of that question will fall even shorter of a comprehensive reply than in the first two cases. But at least there will be some suggestions of relationships among war, domestic violence, revolution, and routine contention for power.
Huntington's Synthesis
One of the most sophisticated recent syntheses of the standard views concerning all these matters comes from Samuel Huntington. In his Political Order in Changing Societies, Huntington argues that the widespread domestic violence and instability of the 1950s and 1960s in many parts of the world "was in large part the product of rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics, coupled with the slow development of political institutions." 3 He goes on to portray an interaction among these elements:
If a society is to maintain a high level of community, the expansion of political participation must be accompanied by the development of stronger, more complex, and more autonomous political institutions. The effect of the expansion of political participation, however, is usually to undermine the traditional political institutions and to obstruct the development of modern political ones. Modernization and social mobilization, in particular, thus tend to produce political decay unless steps are taken to moderate or to restrict its impact on political consciousness and political involvement. Most societies, even those with fairly complex and adaptable traditional political institutions, suffer a loss of political community and decay of political institutions during the most intense phases of modernization.4
Huntington deliberately applies this lead-lag model to Western revolutions, treating them as extreme cases of the conflicts which emerge when political institutionalization proceeds too slowly for the paces of large-scale social change (which Huntington treats as more or less identical with "modernization") and of mobilization. Moreover, John Gillis has recently argued that the model applies specifically to the European modernizing revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-turies.5 It is therefore legitimate to ask how strong a grip on the Western experience with revolutions and violent conflict Huntington's analysis gives us. My answer is that the grip is needlessly weak-weak, because the scheme founders in tautologies, contradictions, omissions, and failures to examine the evidence seriously. Needlessly, because several of the main arguments concerning mobilization, political participation, and conflict improve vastly on the usual social-psychological tracing of "violence" or "protest" back to "strain" or "discontent."
Although it would be worth trying, this article will not attempt to wrench Huntington's theory into shape. I shall dwell on it in other ways, for other reasons, because in one manner or another it sums up most of the conventional wisdom connecting revolution to large-scale structural change; because Huntington places an exceptional range of contemporary and historical material within its framework; because the variables within it appear to be of the right kind; and because it is sturdy enough to exempt me from the accusation of having erected, and then burned, a straw man as I build up an alternative line of argument.
Huntington offers several criteria for the institutionalization of the existing political organization: adaptability, complexity, autonomy, coherence (with the latter essentially meaning consensus among the active participants in the political system). This sort of definition-making increases the risk that Huntington's arguments will become tautological. To the extent that one judges adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence on the basis of the absence or containment of domestic violence ar)d instability, the circle of truth by definition will close. Nevertheless, Huntington's balanced-development theory is appealing in its combination of three factors-rapid social change, mobilization, and political institutionalization-which other authors have employed separately in one-factor explanations of stability and instability. It does, furthermore, provide a plausible explanation of the twentiethcentury concentration of revolution, governmental instability, and collective violence in the poorer (but not the poorest) countries of the world; the more plausible because it appears to dispose of the anomaly that by many standards the relatively peaceful richer countries are also the faster changing. Huntington's stress on the importance of group claims on the political system by mobilizing segments of the population is a distinct improvement over the more usual model of accumulating individual grievances. Indeed, the most attractive general feature of Huntington's scheme is its deliberate flight from psychologism, from the assumption that the central things to be explained by a theory of revolution are why, when, and how large numbers of individual men become discontented.
Not that I find the theory convincing, even where it escapes tautology. Its plausibility begins to wither as we examine the portion of the argument that deals directly with the political consequences of large-scale structural change: "Not only does social and economic modernization produce political instability, but the degree of instability is related to the rate of modernization. The historical evidence with respect to the West is overwhelming on this point." 6 I beg leave not to be overwhelmed by the available evidence. Almost all the sources habitually cited by Huntington and others in this regard refer to static cross-sectional comparisons of contemporary states during short spans of recent years or the distribution of support for ostensibly radical political movements like Communists. In order to be even mildly persuaded, one would want to have reliable information on the effects of changes in the rate of "social and economic modernization" within the same countries.
Very few over-time studies of the problem have ever been done. The vast long-run analyses of Sorokin offer no particular support for the thesis that the pace of change governs the degree of instability.7 Such longitudinal evidence as my collaborators and I have been able to assemble for European countries in the modern period displays plenty of violent conflict in the modern period. But it suggests either no direct relationship with the pace of structural change, or a negative one: rapid change, diminution of political conflict. In France since 1830, for example, we have discovered a broad tendency for times of rapid urbanization to produce less collective violence than the rest. Among the big cross-sectional studies, Ted Gurr's analysis of 1,000-odd "strife events" occurring in 114 polities from 1961 through 1965-the most careful and comprehensive of its kind-offers little comfort to anyone who views the pace of change as a powerful determinant of the level of conflict.8 Within his scheme, the variables which turn out to carry the explanatory weight have to do with the illegitimacy of the regime, the difficulty of communications within the country, the existence of foreign support for potential dissidents, the presence of an illegal but active Communist party, economic discrimination, political discrimination, religious cleavage, dependence on private foreign capital, potential separatism, and so on. of his analysis Gurr found a considerable concentration of political conflict in the poorer countries, but not the poorest ones-the very "modernizing" countries whose high propensity to instability Huntington is seeking to account for. As the analysis of causal factors proceeded, Gurr generally ruled out the pace of industrialization, urbanization, and so on in favor of a cluster of structural, organizational, and international relations characteristics which form the special burden of those poorer countries. Gurr's own interpretation of his findings runs in terms of relative deprivation, rising expectations, and the like. But it takes quite an inferential chain to go from the structural conditions he actually indexes to the psychic orientations his theory deals with. Perhaps we can attach the greater importance to Gurr's findings because he eventually sharpened a rather different axe from the one he was grinding.
On a smaller scale, the exact connections which are usually alleged to tie instability to rapid structural change also turn out to be dubious. Rapid rural-to-urban migration has no particular tendency to excite protest; marginal urban populations are not the tinder of revolutions; the initial exposure of peasants to factories does not generate high levels of industrial conflict; and so on. Huntington himself happens onto some of the evidence with apparent surprise when he observes that the big-city lumpenproletariat in modernizing countries, contrary to theory, tends to be a passive or even conservative political force, and when he goes on to speculate that urbanization may be negatively correlated with revolution.9 Yet somehow this important qualification does not penetrate to the general statement of the theory.
To accept the Huntingtonian theory confidently, one would also want clear distinctions among radicalism, instability, violence, extent of protest, and propensity to revolution-not to mention a specification of their relationships to each other. That they are equivalent or closely related constitutes a theory to be tested, not a postulate from which theorizing may begin. As it happens, Huntington never quite clears away this difficulty. He succeeds in detaching revolution from the other phenomena by inflating it: "A revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies." 10 By this standard one might reasonably argue that no revolution has ever occurred, but one certainly would not confuse revolution with simple violence or protest. For the rest, however, Huntington willingly couples or confounds violence with "other forms of disorder. Revolution is thus an aspect of modernization. It is not something which can occur in any type of society at any period in its history. It is not a universal category but rather an historically limited phenomenon. It will not occur in highly traditional societies with very low levels of social and economic complexity. Nor will it occur in highly modern societies. Like other forms of violence and instability, it is most likely to occur in societies which have experienced some social and economic development and where the processes of political modernization and political development have lagged behind the processes of social and economic change.12 Thus the imbalances which account for other forms of "disorder" also account for revolution: "The political essence of revolution is the rapid expansion of political consciousness and the rapid mobilization of new 12 Ibid., p. 265.
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Charles Tilly groups into politics at a speed which makes it impossible for existing political institutions to assimilate them. Revolution is the extreme case of the explosion of political participation." 13 Huntington then distinguishes between an Eastern and a Western pattern of revolution. In the Eastern, new groups mobilize into politics, they fashion new political institutions, and they overthrow the old order; anticolonial revolutions are the type case. In the Western, the old political institutions disintegrate and only then new groups mobilize into politics, create new political institutions, and come to power. The Russian Revolution is typical. The "decay" of established institutions plays a large part in the Western pattern, according to Huntington, and a small part in the Eastern. As a result, the sequences are rather different. Nevertheless, in both cases the immediate cause of revolution is supposed to be the discrepancy between the performance of the regime and the demands being made upon it. In both cases that discrepancy is supposed to increase as a consequence of the mobilization of new groups into politics, which in turn occurs as a more or less direct effect of rapid social and economic change.
The danger of circular argument is just as apparent here as before. In his detailed argumentation, Huntington does not really escape the fateful circularity of judging the extent of the discrepancy from the character of the revolution which presumably resulted from the discrepancy. He tells us, for example, that:
The great revolutions of history have taken place either in highly centralized traditional monarchies (France, China, Russia), or in narrowly based military dictatorships (Mexico, Bolivia, Guatemala, Cuba), or in colonial regimes (Vietnam, Algeria). All these political systems demonstrated little if any capacity to expand their power and to provide channels for the participation of new groups in politics.'4 Suppose we suppress the urge to blurt out questions about England in the 1640s or the United States in the 1860s and stifle suspicions that the implicit standard for great revolutions at work in this passage simply restricts them logically to centralized, authoritarian regimes. We still must wonder how we could have known before the fact of revolution that the expansive capacity of these governments was inferior to that of the many other monarchies, military dictatorships, and colonial regimes which did not experience revolutions.
Huntington does not answer. In its present form his scheme does not, it appears, give us any solid guidance in the anticipation or production 13 Ibid., p. 266. 14 Ibid., p. 275. 
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Charles Tilly into its components instead of treating it as a unitary phenomenon; we must investigate the precise ways in which urbanization or political centralization affect the mobilization and demobilization of different segments of the population; and we must specify and trace the relations of each major segment to the changing structure of power. Here I simply want to sketch a line of argument embodying an attempt to move in the direction I call desirable. The argument grows from an effort to document and explain changes in the character of political conflict (especially in its violent forms) in European countries over recent centuries. On its home ground, the argument is ambiguous at some points and eminently debatable at others. Far too little systematic evidence is now available to put it to any comprehensive test. The formulations reflect modern European experience too directly to warrant any confidence that they apply to the rest of the world. I inflict them on my readers only because that European experience has, in fact, provided the bulk of the models for the analysis of revolution in the contemporary world, because the scheme does help make sense of the European experience, because at some points the line of argument yields testable inferences, and because such small evidence as I have been able to accumulate from a few countries over a few centuries appears to support those inferences.
A Model of Political Conflict
First, a simple model of political action. Let us distinguish three kinds of social unit within any specified population. A government is an organization which controls the principal concentrated means of coercion within the population; a contender for power is a group within the population which at least once during some standard period applies resources to influence that government; and a polity is the set of contenders which routinely and successfully lays claims on that government. (We may call these individual contenders members of the polity, while challenger is a good name for a contender laying claims in an irregular or unsuccessful fashion.) Almost any population beyond a very small scale will include more than one contender. Almost any large population will include more than one government, hence more than one polity. But many theoretically possible contenders will not contend during any particular period; some will never contend. A group gains the capacity to contend by mobilizing: by acquiring collective control over resources-land, labor, information, arms, money, and so on-which can be applied to influence the government; it loses that capacity by demobilizing-losing collective control over resources. 437
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Every polity, then, collectively develops tests of membership. The tests always include the capacity to bring considerable numbers of men into action; they may also include the possession of wealth, certified birth, religious stigmata, and many other characteristics. Challengers acquire membership in the polity by meeting the tests, despite the fact that existing members characteristically resist new admissions and employ the government's resources to make admissions more difficult. The members also test each other more or less continuously; a member failing the tests tends to lose membership in the polity. Each change in membership moves the tests in a direction harmonious with the characteristics and capacities of the set of members emerging from the change. The members of the polity come to treat the prevailing criteria of membership as having a special moral virtue. Challengers denied admission tend to define themselves as being deprived of rights due them on general grounds. Members losing position tend, in contrast, to accent tradition, usage, and particular agreements in support of their claims to threatened privileges and resources. Thus contenders both entering and leaving the polity have a special propensity to articulate strongly moral definitions of their situations.
The model is simple and broad. I have compressed its presentation unmercifully, because its only function here is as a vehicle for the analysis of large-scale political conflicts. Even in precis, however, a large practical disadvantage becomes clear: the model's requirement for data concerning the mobilization, contention, and testing of a considerable number of different groups within a population of any sizenot the sort of data drawn readily from a World Handbook. There are compensating advantages: the avoidance of that ill-defined entity called a "society" as the basic analytic unit, the well-defined connections among mobilization, contention, and conflict, the easy accommodation to the existence of multiple governments within the same population.
The scheme also permits us to specify the close relationship between collective violence and the central political process: (a) political life consists largely of making collective claims for resources and privileges controlled by governments; (b) collective violence is largely a by-product of situations in which one contender openly lays such claims and other contenders (or, especially, the government) resist these claims; (c) such situations occur with particular frequency when groups are acquiring or losing membership-that is, partly because testing tends to take that form, partly because the moral orientations of the groups whose memberships are disputed encourage the individuals within them to take exceptional risks of damage or injury, partly because the activation of the coercive forces of the government increases the likelihood of damage or injury to other participants; (d) hence collective violence tends to cluster around major or multiple entries and exits; (e) governments themselves act to maintain priority over substantial concentrations of coercive resources, so that a contender accumulating such resources outside the control of the government is quite likely to find itself in acute conflict with the agents of the government.
As a consequence, the common theories of violence which treat it as a product of the willingness of certain kinds of individuals or groups to "resort to violence" to express themselves or accomplish their ends fall wide of the mark. Those equally common theories which distinguish sharply between violent and orderly political actions fail just as badly. The one misses the extent to which collective violence is a contingent outcome of interactions among contenders and governments, in which the agents of government commonly have the greater discretion and do most of the injury and damage. The other misses the great continuity between nonviolent and violent political actions. In Europe of the last few hundred years, at least, the great bulk of collective violence has (a) involved agents of the government, (b) grown from collective actions (such as assemblies, demonstrations, or strikes) which were not intrinsically violent, indeed which usually went on without violence. Lovers of order and defenders of the state have obscured these facts by expanding the word "violence" to include not only physical damage but also a wide range of illegal, unseemly, and symbolically repugnant behavior. In our own day as well it is customary to puff up the idea of violence until it has little value as an analytic tool but carries great moral weight; thus, Jacques Ellul's provocative essay (called, simply, Violence) treats without distinction almost every form of coercion men employ.22
Revolutions
We now have the means of moving on to revolution. The multiplication of polities is the key. A revolution begins when a government previously under the control of a single, sovereign polity becomes the object of effective, competing, mutually exclusive claims from two or more separate polities. A revolution ends when a single polity-by no means necessarily the same one-regains control over the government. This multiple sovereignty can result from the attempt of one polity to subordinate another heretofore independent polity; from the assertion of sovereignty by a previously subordinate polity; from the formation of a bloc of challengers which seizes control of some portion of the government apparatus; from the fragmentation of an existing polity into blocs, each of which controls some part of the government. Many observers would prefer to restrict the label "revolution" to the action by challengers; many others would prefer to call each of these a different major type of revolution: civil war, national revolution, and so on. I begin with an exceptionally broad definition to call attention to the common properties of the various paths through multiple sovereignty.
This labeling is a delicate matter. As with "violence," many groups want to define their own political objectives by reference to revolution, whether they fear or welcome an overturn of things as they are. Most debates over the scope of the term contain the germ of a debate over goals. Some readers will surely conclude that by calling any development of multiple sovereignty revolutionary I cheapen a valuable word and erase crucial distinctions between true revolutions and mere coups, bootless rebellions, and simple brigandage. If there were, in fact, wide agreement in the scholarly and hortatory literature on the criteria for revolution, I would not hesitate to accept a narrower definition. But there is precious little agreement. The varieties of political discontinuity have a disconcerting tendency to overlap and run into each other, as illustrated by the far-reaching effects of the "mere coups" involved in the Meiji Restoration and the accession of Mustafa Kemal to power. As a consequence, there are strong advantages to beginning with the common denominator of a wide variety of phenomena-multiple sovereignty-and then creating types of revolution by subdivision. It is not hard to recreate all the major customary types by introducing the following variables: (1) extent of change in the structure of the polity; (2) composition of the rival polities in the period of multiple sovereignty; and (3) extent of structural change resulting from the revolution. These three variables fairly well exhaust the further distinctions which are most commonly made: success versus failure, proletarian versus bourgeois, colonial versus noncolonial, center-to-periphery versus peripheryto-center, and so on.
Conditions for Revolution
At one time or another the building of European states led down all four paths to multiple sovereignty: (1) attempts of one polity to subordinate another independent polity-a standard situation in the dynastic and colonial warmaking of the sixteenth century and later; (2) the assertion of sovereignty by a previously subordinate polity-the diverse Habsburg empire was peculiarly subject to this outcome, and the revolutions of the Netherlands and Catalonia are prime examples; (3) the 440 formation of a bloc of challengers which seizes control of some portion of the government apparatus-the purest cases are peasant revolts, but every major revolution included some such action; (4) the fragmentation of an existing polity into blocs, each controlling some part of the government-with the important qualification that coalitions between members and challengers (in this case, especially working-class groups) were frequent and influential. This was the pattern in the Sicilian revolution with which we began, the standard pattern in 1848 as a whole, and no doubt the most common pattern among all modern western revolutions. What observable political conditions, then, ought to prevail before a revolution begins? Three conditions appear to be necessary, and a fourth strongly facilitating. The three apparently necessary conditions are:
1. The appearance of contenders or coalitions of contenders, advancing exclusively alternative claims to the control over the government currently exerted by the members of the polity; 2. commitment to those claims by a significant segment of the subject population; 3. unwillingness or incapacity of the agents of the government to suppress the alternative coalition or the commitment to its claims.
The strongly facilitating condition:
4. formation of coalitions between members of the polity and the contenders making the alternative claims.
Let me confess at once that the list contains little news not already borne by the definition of revolution as a state of multiple sovereignty. The purpose of the list is simply to focus the explanation of revolution on the structure of power, and away from the general level of strain, discontent, disequilibrium, or mobilization. At first approach, the argument therefore resembles Huntington's; both of them attach great importance to encounters between existing political arrangements and specific mobilized groups making new and powerful demands on the government. This analysis veers away from Huntington's, especially in denying the significance of a discrepancy between the overall rates of mobilization and institutionalization, in attaching great importance to conflicts over claims, duties, privileges, and conceptions of justice embedded in particular contenders for power, and in drawing attention to the important possibility that the crucial contenders will be disaffected members of a polity rather than newcomers to power. The explanation of revolution, within this formulation, becomes the identification of the probable causes for the three necessary conditions 
Revolution and Some Other Forms of Conflict
The conceptualization of revolution as the appearance of multiple sovereignty leaves some interesting cases at the margin: banditry, durable separatism, foreign intervention in domestic conflict, some varieties of war. At least those cases belong at the margin; they share some, but not all, features of revolutionary situations. They are nevertheless important, because they display the similarities and connections among superficially separate organized uses of force. The similarities are easier to grasp. Eric Hobsbawn, in his beautifully executed brace of books, Bandits and Primitive Rebels,26 has called attention to the common properties of social banditry and popular rebellion; each tends to involve a turning of the back to the state, a wide, tacit conspiracy among members of the population who are not directly engaged in the action, a theme of redressing wrongs committed by the powerful, a romantic ideology framed in terms of traditional obligations and customs, an acting out of "natural justice." Even the less romantic forms of piracy and banditry which flourished around the Mediterranean for centuries bore some striking resemblances to civil war, for they frequently amounted to de facto claims to sovereignty within particular geographic areas. In regions like southern Italy, the bandits sometimes exercised their claims in collusion with the duly constituted authorities of adjacent territories.
In the case of Italy, it also becomes clear that war and revolution have a good deal in common. We conventionally distinguish the two on the basis of (a) the status of each participant at the beginning and the end of the conflict, and (b) the means employed. But in nineteenthcentury Italy the "national revolution" which brought about unification consisted mainly of military conquests by Piedmont, coupled with risings led by such heroic invaders as Mazzini and Garibaldi, insurrections subsidized or even engineered by Piedmont, and further popular rebellions that broke out very widely after invasion had weakened the grips of the old state and the old elite. War or revolution? Both. The same conjunction appears in the multiple rebellions of conquered territories against Napoleon, the movements of resistance against the Nazis, the anti-Japanese phase of the Chinese Revolution, and a great many other important conflicts.
Not only similarities, but interconnections. I have already pointed out that the extent of damage and injury that results from collective violence depends largely on the organization and tactics of the government's own coercive forces. Within strong states, that relationship goes farther. Repression often works. In the European experience of the last two centuries, the substantial periods of respite from collective violence within any particular country have generally been the tenures of repressive regimes: the Spanish dictatorships of Primo de Rivera -and Franco, the Bolsheviks in power, the heydey of Nazism, Italian Facism after 1925, France under Louis Napoleon and-the Resistance notwithstanding-under German occupation. Obviously, I am speaking strictly of collective violence that pits groups of men against each other, and not of terror, torture, individual repression, psychic punishment, or external war. The Nazis (among others) engaged in all of these terrible acts while internal collective violence was at its low point. Just as obviously, all these regimes began with widespread collective violence, and most of them ended with it. So the point is not that repressive regimes are kinder to life. It is rather that by deliberately demobilizing their most likely opponents and closely controlling the opportunities for collective action by any other contender, repressive regimes greatly reduce the chances that collective violence will grow out of contention for power.
Another connection comes to mind. In the West of the past five centuries, perhaps the largest single factor in the promotion of revolutions and collective violence has been the great concentration of power in national states. (I concede that the rise of the national state depended to such a large degree on the growth of production, the expansion of large-scale marketing, the strengthening of the bourgeoisie, and the proliferation of bureaucracy that such a statement commits a dramatic over-
